← News

Critical Vulnerabilities in Brazilian Digital Signature Extensions Require Urgent Attention

Researchers identified remote code execution (RCE) flaws in five popular digital signature extensions in Brazil, exposing millions of users and institutions to fraud and data compromise risks.

By CyberX I.T SolutionsVulnerabilidades10 min readSource: Major Brazilian Signature Apps Enable RCE & Fraud ↗Ler em português →

Cybersecurity researchers have revealed the existence of critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, dubbed "Sign2Shell," in five of the most popular browser extensions used for digital signatures in Brazil. These flaws, which affect millions of users and institutions, could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on compromised machines, paving the way for fraud and unauthorized access to government and corporate systems.

Digital Signature Infrastructure at Risk

Brazil's digital certificate system, which is fundamental for validating legal documents and important transactions, was recently the subject of an investigation by researchers from Bay Area Labs and Am I Being Pwned. They identified flaws in browser extensions widely adopted by millions of users, including government agencies and professionals in the legal, medical, and tax fields.

The vulnerabilities were found in five popular extensions: Lacuna Web PKI, Softplan Web Signer, Certisign WebSigner, Certisign CertiPlugin, and BRy Assinatura Digital. Together, these tools account for more than 10 million installations and are crucial for Brazilian citizens and institutions to sign official documents with the highest degree of trust, as established by the Brazilian Public Key Infrastructure (ICP-Brasil).

The Flaw Mechanism: Insecure DLL Loading

The root of the problem in all five extensions lies in how they allow websites to control the loading of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs). Although loading cryptographic libraries is a normal part of how these applications function, the extensions failed to properly verify the trustworthiness of the loaded files. This means that by luring a victim to a malicious site, an attacker could induce the signing software to download and load malware as if it were a legitimate library, resulting in remote code execution.

The RCE vulnerabilities were rated 9.6 on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), indicating high criticality. Exploiting these flaws could allow fraudsters to sign legal documents on behalf of victims or enable cybercriminals to breach large government organizations and companies handling sensitive information.

Potential Impact and Attack Targets

The user base for these extensions includes some of the country's most important and valuable organizations and professionals. Lacuna, for example, lists the Federal Senate, the National Council of Justice, the Brazilian Navy, and B3 (the stock exchange) among its clients. BRy, in turn, serves the University of São Paulo, the São Paulo Metro, and Caixa Econômica Federal.

Attackers could have exploited these vulnerabilities to infect employees of large state institutions or, more easily, target freelancers such as lawyers, doctors, and accountants. An accountant, for instance, may manage digital signature credentials for hundreds of individuals and companies on a single computer. Access to that computer would allow the attacker to impersonate those people and companies in legally significant transactions, such as forging agreements or submitting fraudulent tax returns.

Remediation and Discrepancies Regarding Fixes

The vulnerabilities were publicly disclosed in mid-November 2026, with most extensions having received patches in mid-September or October of the same year. The identified fixed versions include Lacuna Web PKI 2.18.0, Certisign WebSigner 2.18.0, Softplan Web Signer 2.18.3, and BRy Assinatura Digital 2.2.8.

However, significant discrepancies arose regarding the completeness of the fixes for some extensions. For BRy Assinatura Digital, while researchers from Am I Being Pwned indicated that the flaw could be triggered by an automatic download of a malicious file upon visiting a page, BRy stated in a statement carried by CISO Advisor that "no file was downloaded automatically; the user had to click."

Another significant discrepancy concerns Certisign CertiPlugin. Researchers point out that version 1.15.1 only mitigated the flaw by restricting allowed domains but did not completely fix the underlying issue of insecure DLL loading. On the other hand, Certisign, also via CISO Advisor, suggested that fixes for WebSigner and CertiPlugin were implemented and that updated versions are available through official channels, implying a complete solution.

These discrepancies highlight the complexity of validating security patches and the importance of clear communication between researchers, vendors, and users. The main lesson is the ongoing need for rigor in building security tools and prompt updates by users to protect themselves against persistent threats.

CyberX Technical Analysis

The "Sign2Shell" vulnerabilities exploit a common and dangerous pattern in applications that interact with native operating system components, specifically the loading of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs). The core of the flaw lies in the permission granted by these browser extensions for an external website to dictate which DLL should be loaded by the native component of the signing application. In an ideal scenario, such applications should cryptographically validate the origin and integrity of any DLL before loading it, ensuring that only trusted libraries digitally signed by the vendor are executed.

The absence of this validation allows an attacker, by luring a user to a malicious site or injecting content into a legitimate site (via iframes or ads), to instruct the extension's native component to load an arbitrary DLL. Once loaded, this malicious DLL is executed in the context of the signing application's process, which usually has sufficient privileges to perform significant actions on the user's system, such as arbitrary code execution (RCE).

Conditions and Attack Surface

Exploitation conditions vary slightly between the extensions:

  • Lacuna Web PKI and Certisign WebSigner: A simple visit to a malicious page or a compromised iframe was enough to trigger the flaw, without user interaction ("no click").
  • Softplan Web Signer: Opening a malicious link was sufficient for exploitation.
  • CertiPlugin and BRy Digital Signature: Sources diverge. While some researchers indicate that visiting the page already triggered the download and execution of the malicious file, BRy stated that a user click was required for the download. Regardless of the click requirement, the underlying insecure DLL loading mechanism remained.

The attack surface includes Windows operating systems where the native components of these extensions are installed. Successful exploitation gives the attacker the ability to execute code with the privileges of the logged‑in user, which can lead to:

  • Confidentiality: Access and exfiltration of sensitive data stored on the system.
  • Integrity: Forgery of digital signatures in documents, alteration of files, installation of persistent malware.
  • Availability: Potential disruption of services or data corruption.

CyberX Recommendations for Mitigation

Given the criticality of these vulnerabilities, the following recommendations are essential:

  • Immediate Update: Ensure all digital‑signature extensions and their native components are updated to the patched versions (Lacuna Web PKI 2.18.0, Certisign WebSigner 2.18.0, Softplan Web Signer 2.18.3, BRy Digital Signature 2.2.8). For Certisign CertiPlugin, version 1.15.1 provides partial mitigation, but attention should be heightened.
  • Endpoint Security Solutions (EPP/EDR): Use robust solutions that can detect and block attempts to load unsigned DLLs or DLLs from untrusted sources by legitimate processes.
  • User Awareness: Train users about phishing, social engineering, and browsing suspicious sites. Reinforce the importance of verifying the URL before clicking on **links** or interacting with online content.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Operate with user accounts that have the least possible privilege to limit the impact of a potential exploitation.
  • Application Control: Implement application control policies (as such AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control) to restrict execution of unauthorized code.

CyberX SOC Intelligence Bulletin

The "Sign2Shell" vulnerabilities (CVSS 9.6) in Brazilian digital‑signature extensions represent a critical remote code execution (RCE) risk, with potential for document fraud and system compromise. The core flaw lies in insecure loading of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) by the extensions' native components, allowing an attacker to inject and execute malicious code.

Assets and Exposure Conditions

  • Affected Assets: Windows operating systems with the Lacuna Web PKI, Softplan Web Signer, Certisign WebSigner, Certisign CertiPlugin and BRy Digital Signature browser extensions installed and unpatched.
  • Exposure Conditions: Users browsing malicious sites, clicking suspicious links, or being exposed to compromised iframes/ads on legitimate sites. Exploitation can occur with or without user interaction, depending on the extension and version.

Investigation Signals and Telemetry

SOC teams should actively monitor the following indicators:

  • Process Activity: Observe processes associated with digital‑signature extensions (e.g., lacuna-web-pki-svc.exe, softplan-web-signer.exe, etc.) that spawn unusual child processes or execute unexpected commands.
  • DLL Loading: Monitor DLL loading by these processes from non‑standard directories (e.g., %TEMP%, %APPDATA%) or DLLs without a valid digital signature.
  • Network Activity: Unusual network connections originating from the extensions' processes to suspicious IP addresses or domains.
  • Windows Event Logs:
    • Event ID 4688 (Process Creation): Look for unexpected child processes started by the signing applications.
    • Event ID 7045 (Service Installation): Monitor installation of new services that may be related to malware persistence.
  • Proxy/Firewall Logs: Identify attempts to download executable files or DLLs from untrusted sources.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

No verifiable indicators of compromise (file hashes, malicious IP addresses, C2 domains) were identified in the consulted sources. The nature of the vulnerability (RCE via DLL loading) implies that IoCs would be specific to the payload used in a real attack.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • Initial Access (TA0001):
    • T1204.002 – User Execution: Malicious File: The attacker lures the user to execute a malicious file, which in this case is a DLL loaded by the legitimate application.
  • Execution (TA0002):
    • T1059 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: Execution of the malicious DLL can lead to arbitrary command execution via script interpreters.
    • T1574.001 – Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking or T1574.002 – Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side‑Loading: The central mechanism of the vulnerability, where the attacker manipulates the DLL loading process to run their own code.
  • Persistence (TA0003) & Privilege Escalation (TA0004): Arbitrary code execution can be used to establish persistence on the system (e.g., installing backdoors) and, depending on the privileges of the extension process, to elevate privileges.

Remediations and Mitigation

  • Urgent Update: Prioritize updating all extensions and their native components to the patched versions:
    • Lacuna Web PKI: 2.18.0
    • Certisign WebSigner: 2.18.0
    • Softplan Web Signer: 2.18.3
    • BRy Digital Signature: 2.2.8
    • For Certisign CertiPlugin: Version 1.15.1 provides partial mitigation by restricting domains, but the complete fix for the DLL loading flaw is still questioned by researchers. Caution and additional monitoring are recommended.
  • Endpoint Security Controls: Configure EDR/EPP to block execution of unsigned DLLs or those from untrusted sources by legitimate applications.
  • Web Content Filtering: Use proxies and firewalls to block access to known malicious sites and filter suspicious web content.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure users operate with the minimum privileges necessary for their roles.

Response and Evidence Preservation

In case of detection of suspicious activity:

  • Containment: Immediately isolate the compromised system from the network.
  • Evidence Collection: Perform a forensic disk image, collect Windows event logs, EDR logs, network logs, and any suspicious files found.
  • Malware Analysis: Submit any suspicious DLLs or executables for malware analysis.
  • Notification: Notify internal stakeholders and, if applicable, the appropriate authorities and the extension vendors.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Sign2Shell?

Sign2Shell is a set of remote code execution vulnerabilities affecting five popular Brazilian digital signature browser extensions.

Which extensions are affected?

The affected extensions are Lacuna Web PKI, Softplan Web Signer, Certisign WebSigner, Certisign CertiPlugin, and BRy Assinatura Digital.

How can attackers exploit these vulnerabilities?

Attackers can load malicious DLLs through compromised websites, enabling arbitrary code execution with the user's privileges.

Have the extensions been patched?

Yes, patches were released in mid‑September and October 2026, but some fixes may be incomplete.

What should users do?

Users should update to the latest patched versions and monitor for suspicious activity.

Esta análise foi útil?

Ainda não há avaliações.