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BO Team Uses Log4Shell Flaw in VMware vCenter to Attack Russian Supply Chain

A Kaspersky investigation revealed that the BO Team group exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in a VMware vCenter server, compromising the development infrastructure of a Russian company to carry out a supply chain attack.

By CyberX I.T SolutionsCibersegurança11 min readSource: BO Team Exploits Log4Shell in VMware vCenter, Compromises Russian Firm's Code-Signing Server ↗Ler em português →

A detailed investigation of suspicious activity on the network of a Russian software developer uncovered months-long compromise of its development infrastructure and code‑signing server. The activity, documented by Kaspersky’s ICS‑CERT team after being contacted by the affected developer in June 2025, was attributed to the threat group BO Team, also known as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena and Lifting Zmiy.

The targeted company was not disclosed, but it operates in Russia and develops software for a client base in the Russian Federation, according to Kaspersky. Over several months, the intrusion resulted in the theft of confidential information and the compromise of all components of the organization’s IT infrastructure, including Windows and Linux servers, workstations, hypervisors, backup servers, security‑solution management servers, and network equipment.

The BO Team Group and Its Objectives

Active since at least 2023, BO Team focuses on cyber‑espionage and hacktivism, with a history of attacks against Russian entities to steal valuable data and infiltrate compromised infrastructures. The group is assessed as Ukrainian‑origin, with its primary motivations being the degradation of the Russian military‑industrial complex to weaken Moscow’s operational capabilities on the battlefield, according to analysis by Orange Cyberdefense. They also engage in cognitive warfare to humiliate Russian institutions and demonstrate their vulnerability to Ukrainian digital resistance.

Although BO Team is known for deploying ransomware and publicizing its activities on a dedicated Telegram channel, the attack on the software developer did not involve data destruction or publications claiming responsibility. Instead, the attackers worked to entrench themselves in the victim’s network, setting up convenient command channels and planting backdoors to restore access if lost. The compromise of the software development (CI/CD) infrastructure and the code‑signing server indicated that the attack would likely evolve into a supply‑chain scenario.

Exploitation Mechanism and Lateral Movement

The attack, according to the Russian cybersecurity firm, involved the compromise of a Linux terminal server in the organization, exploiting an exposed SSH service. This initial access was used to conduct internal network reconnaissance, identifying systems with accessible SMB, Kerberos, SSH, Telnet, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, WinRM, and LDAP services. The attackers unsuccessfully attempted to access internal portals and sites such as proxy‑sale[.]com, start.duckduckgo[.]com, vcsa.vmware[.]com and vulners[.]com.

Event logs showed that the attackers tried to connect from the compromised terminal server to the virtualization system’s servers, including login attempts to the VMware vCenter web interface. Although these login attempts initially failed, BO Team successfully exploited a VMware vCenter server (version 7.0.3) vulnerable to CVE‑2021‑44228 (Log4Shell), obtaining a remote command line with root privileges. From there, they connected to the hypervisor via SSH and identified accessible hosts.

Post‑Exploitation Tactics and Persistence

At this stage, a backdoor was deployed on the hypervisor, executed hourly via a shell script in the /etc/cron.hourly/ directory. The script, named “pgcache”, likely attempted to masquerade as a legitimate PostgreSQL component. The backdoor’s primary function was to download and execute a secondary shell script from lo1yaizaeghaevarooD1ahtaichootae.nofrillsdns[.]com, which in turn downloaded and ran the Global Socket (GSocket) utility, enabling remote control of the compromised host.

Other post‑exploitation actions included:

  • Gaining access to the corporate proxy server.

  • Abusing the compromised hypervisor’s certificate to connect to servers in a second virtualization cluster and deploy a similar backdoor.

  • Collecting information about virtual machines and firewall rules, accessing some of them via a command‑line interpreter on the guest OS from the hypervisor.

  • Executing an obfuscated bash script to decrypt and run an ELF binary for remote control via SSH.

  • Searching for secrets in compromised virtual machines, enabling breach of the GitLab development platform VM, access to source‑code repositories, and the server’s private key.

  • Using the GitLab VM’s private key to connect to the organization’s Ansible orchestration system.

  • Using access to the Linux terminal server to locate credentials for multiple domain accounts and connect to the domain controller using a system administrator’s account, likely after accessing memory of virtual machines on compromised hypervisors.

  • Modifying security attributes of the user’s Windows Downloads folder.

  • Using legitimate binaries such as tasklist.exe, findstr.exe, taskmgr.exe and ipconfig.exe to identify security solutions and collect network‑interface details.

  • Attempts to dump the lsass.exe process using Nanodump and later comsvcs.dll to obtain domain administrator credentials.

  • Dumping the system registry using regedit.exe to decrypt the Active Directory domain database (ntds.dit) and extract credentials for all domain users.

  • Using the OpenSSH scp.exe utility to transfer collected information to the terminal server.

  • Logging into the domain controller using a domain administrator’s Kerberos ticket, compromising the organization’s entire Windows infrastructure by exploiting the reuse of the same password across administrator accounts in different domains.

  • Modifying /usr/bin/nxnode-login to intercept and record user credentials in a shared memory file.

  • Brute‑force attempts against the administrator’s terminal server password.

To hinder detection, BO Team employed timestomping techniques, malicious code obfuscation, “living‑off‑the‑land” (LotL) techniques, systematic event‑log deletion, and disguising malicious files as legitimate software. Kaspersky noted that the attackers favored system tools such as RDP, SSH, and SCP instead of malware, which aligns with BO Team’s profile.

Response and Prevention of Greater Damage

Despite the extent of the compromise, Kaspersky concluded that, thanks to the rapid response measures applied after the incident was discovered, the attackers lost access to the compromised infrastructure and apparently were unable to carry the attack to its intended conclusion, which was to inject malicious code into an organization’s solution to compromise its customers (supply chain attack).

After losing access to the compromised infrastructure, the attackers orchestrated a phishing campaign in late July 2025, attempting to collect employee credentials. The phishing email, with the subject “Disconnected account from mail server”, tried to trick the recipient into clicking a password‑reset link. The email managed to bypass SPF and DKIM checks, indicating that the attackers possessed a private key obtained after taking control of the organization’s mail server. However, the phishing attack was detected and prevented.

The activity was traced to IP addresses 193.3.23[.]236 and 80.76.42[.]139, both belonging to a provider in Ukraine. Additional analysis revealed that the attackers followed a standard work schedule and operated in a time zone that differed “only slightly” from that of the victim Russian entity.

CyberX Technical Analysis

The incident investigated by Kaspersky illustrates the persistence and sophistication of threat groups such as the BO Team, which combine known vulnerabilities with advanced lateral‑movement and evasion tactics. Exploiting CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) on a VMware vCenter server (version 7.0.3) was the critical point for obtaining root privileges and access to the virtualization environment.

Exploitation Mechanism

Log4Shell is a critical‑severity remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting the Apache Log4j library. In the context of VMware vCenter, the exploit allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code, typically via malicious JNDI requests. Because vCenter is a central component in managing virtualized environments, its compromise gives attackers significant control over the underlying infrastructure, including hypervisors and virtual machines.

Attack Chain and Persistence

The attack chain began with initial access via exposed SSH, followed by internal reconnaissance. Successful exploitation of Log4Shell in vCenter enabled the deployment of a backdoor on the hypervisor. This backdoor, masquerading as a PostgreSQL component and run via cron, used the GSocket utility and the nofrillsdns[.]com service for C2 communication. Choosing a free DNS service and configuring a DNS record to 127.0.0.1 when the C2 is inactive demonstrates a clever evasion and persistence technique, activating the backdoor only with a DNS‑record change.

Evasion Tactics and Lateral Movement

The BO Team showed a strong focus on “living‑off‑the‑land” (LotL) techniques, using legitimate system tools (such as RDP, SSH, SCP, tasklist.exe, findstr.exe, ipconfig.exe, regedit.exe, comsvcs.dll) to perform reconnaissance, lateral movement, and credential exfiltration. Preference for these tools instead of custom malware makes detection by signature‑based security solutions harder. Systematic event‑log deletion, timestomping, and code obfuscation are additional tactics to avoid detection and forensic analysis.

CyberX Recommendations

  • Urgent Patching: Ensure all VMware vCenter systems and other applications that use Apache Log4j are updated with the latest patches for CVE-2021-44228 (VMSA-2021-0028).

  • SSH Security: Implement strong authentication (MFA), limit SSH access to trusted IPs only, and rigorously monitor failed login attempts.

  • Network Segmentation: Isolate critical environments such as development infrastructure (CI/CD), code‑signing servers, and virtualization systems from other corporate networks.

  • LotL Activity Monitoring: Deploy EDR and SIEM solutions configured to detect unusual use of legitimate system utilities, such as those used for credential dumping (lsass.exe, ntds.dit) or reconnaissance.

  • Credential Management: Adopt strong password policies, MFA for all privileged accounts, and regular credential rotation. Avoid password reuse across different domains or systems.

  • DNS Monitoring: Monitor DNS queries for unusual or newly registered domains, especially those associated with free DNS services like nofrillsdns[.]com.

  • Hypervisor Hardening: Apply security best practices for hypervisors, including disabling unnecessary services and monitoring scripts in auto‑startup directories (e.g., /etc/cron.hourly/).

  • Phishing Awareness: Train employees to identify and report phishing emails, especially those that attempt to bypass security checks such as SPF/DKIM.

CyberX SOC Intelligence Bulletin

The BO Team, a threat group motivated by cyber‑espionage and hacktivism, exploited the critical Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) on a VMware vCenter server (version 7.0.3) to gain privileged access and extensively compromise the development infrastructure of a Russian organization, aiming for a supply‑chain attack. The intrusion, which lasted months, demonstrated advanced persistence, lateral‑movement, and evasion tactics, focusing on credential theft and the use of legitimate system tools.

Assets and Exposure Conditions

  • VMware vCenter servers (version 7.0.3 or earlier) without patches for CVE-2021-44228.

  • Linux servers with SSH exposed to the Internet or less‑secure networks.

  • Development infrastructure (CI/CD) and code‑signing servers.

  • Systems with weak or reused credentials, especially for domain and administrator accounts.

  • Mail servers with compromised private keys or vulnerable SPF/DKIM configurations.

Investigation Indicators (IoCs and Behaviors)

  • Exploited Vulnerability: CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) in VMware vCenter.

  • Initial Access: Successful SSH login attempts or failures followed by success on Linux terminal servers.

  • Backdoor: Presence of suspicious scripts in /etc/cron.hourly/ (e.g., “pgcache”).

  • C2 Communication: Outbound connections to lo1yaizaeghaevarooD1ahtaichootae.nofrillsdns[.]com, lo1yaizaeghaevarood1ahtaichootaz.nofrillsdns[.]com or other subdomains of nofrillsdns[.]com.

  • Tools: Use of the Global Socket (GSocket) utility.

  • Credential Dumping: Execution of Nanodump, use of comsvcs.dll to dump lsass.exe, or use of regedit.exe to export the system registry (especially for ntds.dit).

  • System Modifications: Changes to /usr/bin/nxnode-login, creation of files in /dev/shm/ with unusual names.

  • Discovery: Execution of tasklist.exe, findstr.exe, taskmgr.exe, ipconfig.exe in sequence or in unusual contexts.

  • Evasion: Deletion of event logs, timestomping (modification of file timestamps), script obfuscation.

  • Phishing: Phishing emails with the subject “Account disconnected from the mail server” or similar, bypassing SPF/DKIM.

  • Suspicious IP Addresses: Traffic from or to 193.3.23[.]236 and 80.76.42[.]139.

MITRE ATT&CK

  • Initial Access (TA0001): T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application - Log4Shell), T1078 (Valid Accounts - SSH).

  • Execution (TA0002): T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter - Bash, PowerShell).

  • Persistence (TA0003): T1543.003 (Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service), T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Cron Job).

  • Privilege Escalation (TA0004): T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - Log4Shell root access).

  • Defense Evasion (TA0005): T1070.004 (Indicator Removal: File Deletion), T1070.006 (Indicator Removal: Timestomp), T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information), T1036.005 (Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location).

  • Credential Access (TA0006): T1003 (OS Credential Dumping - Lsass, Ntds.dit), T1552.001 (Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files).

  • Discovery (TA0007): T1083 (File and Directory Discovery), T1046 (Network Service Discovery), T1016 (System Network Configuration Discovery).

  • Lateral Movement (TA0008): T1021.004 (Remote Services: SSH), T1021.001 (Remote Services: RDP).

  • Command and Control (TA0011): T1071.001 (Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols), T1090.002 (Proxy: External Proxy).

  • Impact (TA0040): T1565.001 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain).

Fixes and Mitigation

  • Software Update: Immediately apply VMware patches for CVE-2021-44228 (VMSA-2021-0028) on all vCenter servers.

  • Access Hardening: Restrict SSH access to critical servers, use SSH keys instead of passwords, and implement MFA.

  • Log Monitoring: Configure the SIEM to alert on failed login attempts, unusual cron job activities, credential dumping tool executions, and outbound connections to suspicious domains.

  • Network Segmentation: Isolate development infrastructure, code signing servers, and virtualization environments in separate network segments with strict access controls.

  • Endpoint Detection: Use EDR to monitor system utility usage, detect obfuscated scripts, and timestomping activities.

  • Email Security: Implement robust DMARC, SPF, and DKIM, and monitor reports for spoofing detection.

Response and Evidence Preservation

  • Containment: Immediately isolate any compromised or suspicious systems.

  • Log Collection: Preserve logs from vCenter, hypervisors, domain controllers, Linux servers, firewalls, and email systems.

  • Forensic Analysis: Perform forensic imaging of compromised systems for in-depth analysis.

  • C2 Review: Block identified C2 domains and IPs at the firewall and proxy.

  • Credential Review: Force password resets for all domain and privileged accounts.

Frequently Asked Questions

Which vulnerability did BO Team exploit to access the VMware vCenter server?

The group exploited CVE-2021-44228, also known as Log4Shell, on a VMware vCenter server version 7.0.3 to obtain a remote command line with root privileges.

What was the primary objective of the BO Team's intrusion?

The attackers aimed to carry out a supply chain attack by injecting malicious code into the organization's software solution to compromise its customers.

How did the attackers maintain persistence on the hypervisor?

They deployed a backdoor executed hourly via a shell script in the /etc/cron.hourly/ directory, which masqueraded as a legitimate PostgreSQL component named 'pgcache'.

Did the attackers successfully complete the supply chain attack?

No, Kaspersky concluded that the attackers lost access to the infrastructure due to rapid response measures and were unable to carry the attack to its intended conclusion.

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